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RECENT BOOKS 
A HISTORY OF LAY JUDGES. By John P. Dawson. Cambridge, Massachu-
setts: Harvard University Press. 1960. Pp. x, 310. $6.50. 
Research and writing in English legal history has tended to concentrate 
on the common law, i.e., on the law that developed in the royal courts at 
Westxninster. This is natural enough, for out of the activities of those 
courts evolved our present legal system and substantive law. Moreover, 
they were "professional" courts and their activities are fairly easily re-
ducible to patterns meaningful and interesting to researcher and reader 
alike. But this concentration of scholarly effort has led to distortions in 
our understanding of the earlier judicial system of England. An example 
is a widespread failure to appreciate the substantial importance of the 
local courts in the total adxninistration of English justice. More specifi-
cally, erudite inquiry into the technical process by which debt and 
assumpsit, among other royal writs, led eventually to a systematic common 
law of contracts has tended to conceal the considerable extent to which 
informal contracts were enforced by the local courts, by the canon law, 
and to some extent by the chancery, long before the common law courts 
had managed to extend assumpsit to cover this field. 
A failure to give due weight to the local courts in investigating the 
judicial system of earlier centuries has also led to a failure to appreciate 
fully how long these courts lasted as working, effective courts. The 
central courts were victorious quite early in the competition for jurisdic-
tion with other court systems, but this does not mean that they excluded 
the other systems altogether. Rather they subjected them to control, ap-
propriated from them the more desirable classes of business, and, having 
reduced them to a position where they no longer challenged the primacy 
of the central courts, left them to handle, essentially unhindered, a sub-
stantial amount of small claims and other legal business.1 The long 
duration and considerable importance of the local courts is underscored 
by the 1846 purchase by the town council of Manchester of the lordship 
rights to the Manor of Manchester from Sir Oswald Moseley, for the sum 
of 200,000 pounds. Thereafter the manor court, exceedingly active until 
then, was permitted to disappear.2 Even more recently, in 1948, the homage 
jury of the manor of Fulham, formerly embracing the whole of Fulham 
and Hammersxnith, now a wilderness of brick and asphalt in the west end 
1 Professor Dawson tells a similar story for the French legal system. As late as the 
eve of the revolution there may have been as many as 70,000 to 80,000 judges in all 
the seignorial courts of France (p. 79) • "The truth seems to be that the seignorial 
courts had acquired not so much a corps of judges as an army of predators" (p. 80) • 
2 Pp. 253-54, relying on "WEBB 8: WEBB, ENGUSH LOCAL GOVERNMENT FROM THE 
REvoLUTION TO THE MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS Am: (1906) • Of course it is true that such 
long duration at such a high level of activity was not common. 
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of London, finally ceased to exist and disposed of its remaining assets.a 
Recent researches have thrown some light on the extent to which the law 
of certain manorial courts, still active and important in the seventeenth 
century, influenced markedly the development of the law of Massachusetts. 
They did so because they were more familiar to the Puritan migrants from 
the outlying counties of England than were the central courts far away 
in Westminster.4 
It is the great merit of Professor Dawson's very learned book to correct 
some of these misconceptions and to help give balance to our thinking 
about some aspects of the history of English law. In describing the 
participation of laymen in the administration of English justice, he makes 
it clear to us how important were the various local courts in the over-
all administration of justice. The failure of most writers to deal adequately 
with this subject has not resulted from a lack of material. As the author 
remarks: "In trying to discover the stage that the manorial courts had 
reached by the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, one soon discovers the 
main problem to be an oversupply of information" (p. 208) . The best 
one can do, and what Professor Dawson does particularly well, is to 
engage in limited explorations of part of the data, generalizing cautiously 
and giving a factual basis for some new hypotheses to be tested in further 
research. He has looked in some detail at parts of the papers of the Red-
grave Manor in Suffolk, which was owned first by the Bacon family and 
then by Lord Chief Justice Holt and his descendants (pp. 208-55) . This 
part of the study is the most original, and in my opinion the most 
interesting. 
These contributions alone would make Professor Dawson's book a 
valuable addition to the literature of English legal history. But the book 
does more. The author brings his remarkable knowledge of comparative 
legal history to bear on the history of the lay courts which occupied such 
an important place in English legal history. He finds that the comparable 
courts in France were far more extensively professionalized than in Eng-
land. The £actual description of the development of French (as well as 
German) judicial institutions is highly illuminating to the novice in 
these matters. And when he goes beyond mere description to seek expla-
nations for the great divergence in the evolution of these neighboring 
legal systems that once had so much in common, the writing becomes 
exceptionally fruitful. He suggests that the immediate cause of the diver-
3 London Times, Jan. 3, 1948. No doubt there are many more such examples. 
4 See, e.g., HAsKINs, LAW AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY MAssACHUSE'ITS 163-80 (1960); 
Goebel, King's Law and Local Custom in Seventeenth Century New England, 31 CoLuM. 
L. REV. 416 (1931); Haskins, A Problem in the Reception of the Common Law in the 
Colonial Period, 97 U. PA. L. REv. 842 (1949); Haskins, The Beginnings of the Record-
ing System in Massachusetts, 21 B.U.L. REv. 281 (1941). 
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gence was the adoption in France, but not in England, of the Roman-
canonist procedure, involving proof by individual witnesses given under 
oath. According to the author, this rational and modem system of 
procedure was a voracious maw which devoured trained and experienced 
personnel in ever increasing numbers to shuffle the mountains of paper that 
appeared in the course of natural evolution. On the other hand, the 
English system, far less rational and refined, made maximum use of lay 
personnel. It called upon a group of citizens of the vicinage to decide 
fact questions, relieving the trained justice of the task. It developed 
pleading techniques that reduced the legal issues within a narrow frame-
work and thus lessened the work of the justices. Finally, its appellate 
procedure concentrated on the correction of formal errors on the record, 
rather than the correction of substantial errors through a reconsideration 
of the case. Through all these labor-saving devices, the English system 
could operate with but a handful of professionals, by comparison with 
the French system. In France, in the early decades of the eighteenth 
century, the number of royal judges must have exceeded 5,000, while 
in England during the whole period from 1300 A.D. to 1800 A.D. the 
judges of the central courts of common law and of Chancery seldom 
exceeded fifteen, so effectively had the English Government made use of 
lay and local personnel in the administration of justice (p.71). 
Although this thesis is provocative, it is hard to concede so much effect 
to the mere adoption of the Roman-canonist system of procedure. It, 
like the jury system that was the other main available alternative, does 
not exist in a single unalterable form. There are many possible variations 
on either system and the variations would change the pressures of the 
system with respect to the professionalization of the judiciary. More 
fundamental factors and forces in society must have accounted for the 
fact that the particular variation of the Roman-canonist system of pro-
cedure that developed in France was so insatiable of professional lawmen, 
or, perhaps more appropriately, that the jury system in England operated 
with such an astonishingly limited use of professionals. Professor Dawson 
recognizes the existence of these more basic forces, pointing to the early 
centralization of power in the English crown, and the early determination 
of the vigorous Anglo-Norman kings to govern intensively and pervasively 
and with a firm hand, as decisive causes of the extensive use of laymen in 
the judicial process. Few professionals existed and in the earlier centuries 
there was little prospect of preparing more. The unpaid amateur must 
be dragooned into service to get the job done. "Beginning so early and 
attempting so much, their only recourse was to delegate" (p. 295). It 
may be, as Professor Dawson suggests, that this indeed led to a choice 
of jury trial instead of the Roman-canonist trial procedure. Where his 
explanation seems a little too pat is in suggesting that the choice, once 
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made, was essentially irrevocable (p. 87) , that the system, once started on 
its way, was "further refined and elaborated under the pressure of its own 
internal logic" (p. 68). With all respect, this seems an overdramatization 
and oversimplification of the causal factors. To the extent that it is true, 
it seems a mere statement of the importance of inertia as a factor in legal 
growth. Beyond that, it is hard to believe that there is much of an "internal 
logic" of any system of procedure. The Roman-canonist system, once 
selected, could surely have evolved in a variety of directions, the choice 
among which must have been made because of forces in society rather 
than because of any assumed inherent seminal difference between witness 
proof and trial by jury. The immense variability of a procedural system is 
illustrated, if illustration is necessary, by Professor Dawson's description 
of the procedure in the Court of Chancery, where he takes a view of 
this evolution different from the traditional one. This section is, in 
itself, a fruitful and provocative essay challenging Langdell's classic in-
terpretation of chancery procedure as an adaptation of the canonist 
system (pp. 145-72). 
Moreover, the use of the jury has changed its meaning fundamentally 
since it began its course. In the beginning it "clearly was not, as we con-
sider the jury now to be, a major protection against oppression by govern-
ment; it was, on the contrary, an oppressive exercise of the highest powers 
of government" (p. I 19). This point, repeatedly emphasized by Professor 
Dawson, seems to come closer to explaining the difference between French 
and English development than the mere selection of a procedural form. 
English kings were strong in a period when, in order to be strong, it 
was necessary to encourage and make use of local institutions. When 
French kings became strong, the local institutions had passed into private 
hands, because of the earlier weakness of the royal authority, thus creating 
entirely different pressures for the further evolution of the legal system. 
It is not that the selection of a procedure is unimportant, but that it is 
much less decisive than Professor Dawson would make it. On the other 
hand, Professo_r Dawson's underlining of the choice of a procedural system 
has the great merit of stating emphatically the lawyer's perception of the 
crucial importance of procedure to a society, a point all too little under-
stood by those who have not had legal training, whether they be profes-
sional historians or not. 
If there is any other weakness in the book, and I suggest both with 
great diffidence, it is in Professor Dawson's fascination with paradoxes. 
There is something intriguing about stating a paradox, but perhaps the 
temptation should sometimes be resisted. The main paradox he states 
in more than a single form, one of which we have already seen. It relates 
to the central theme discussed above. "And so we face the paradox, that 
the great power of the English monarchy, mobilized so early, produced in 
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the end self-government" (p. 295) . "The canonist methods of proof were 
soon to require a vast increase in the royal bureaucracy and the criminal 
inquisition came later to symbolize the overriding power of unlimited 
monarchy, but the initial choice of this procedure by the central govern-
ment may well have been due much more to weakness than to strength" 
(p. 48) • Nor are these central paradoxes all he finds. "The land that had 
exported the jury abolished it at home" (p. 122) . "Perhaps this is another 
paradox, that the English respect for law is still partly due to the impor-
tant share that laymen still have in administering it" (p. 145) . The fault, 
if fault it be, is the fondness for dramatic overgeneralization that the liking 
for paradoxes betrays. 
To point to these as the book's worst (though very minor) faults is 
merely another way of saying that this is an exceedingly important study, 
with interesting and fruitful hypotheses about the causal forces operative 
in legal change. This is a book to be read and reread, to be reflected upon 
and reconsidered. This review has pointed out only a tithe of the book's 
contributions to our thinking about our past. It may well become one of 
the classics of English and comparative legal history and should certainly 
become well known to everyone with any interest in that neglected subject. 
Spencer L. Kimball, 
Professor of Law, 
University of Michigan 
